Introduction

In the early hours of June 11, 2024, a line of mournful coffins rolled down National Highway‑2 in Kangpokpi, a town in Manipur’s hilly western belt. The centerpiece was the wooden casket of Haogin Lhouvum, a 27‑year‑old Kuki‑Zo villager whose death in Tamenglong district had ignited a wave of protests across the state. While the visual impact of the procession was stark, the underlying dynamics are far more complex: a decades‑long contest over land, identity, and political patronage, compounded by a fragile security architecture that has repeatedly failed to protect civilians in the region.

This article re‑examines the protest not merely as a reaction to a single homicide, but as a symptom of a broader structural malaise. By tracing the historical roots of Kuki‑Zo‑Tangkhul antagonism, analysing the recent spate of violence, and evaluating the policy responses of the Manipur state government and the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, we aim to illuminate the practical implications for regional stability, electoral politics, and the future of India’s federal security model.

Historical Context: From Colonial Administration to Contemporary Fault Lines

The Kuki‑Zo and Tangkhul peoples have inhabited the undulating valleys of Manipur’s western districts for centuries. British colonial administrators codified tribal boundaries in the early 20th century, creating “tribal districts” that were later merged into the modern state of Manipur after independence. The 1949 merger agreement, however, left many tribal leaders feeling that their autonomy was being eroded, sowing seeds of mistrust that resurfaced after the 1972 re‑organisation of districts.

Demographically, the Kuki‑Zo community accounts for roughly 12 % of Manipur’s 3.2 million population, while the Tangkhul tribe makes up about 5 %. Both groups are predominantly Christian, yet their political allegiances diverge: Kuki‑Zo voters have traditionally supported the Indian National Congress (INC) and regional parties such as the Kuki People’s Party (KPP), whereas Tangkhul voters have leaned toward the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its state‑level ally, the National People's Party (NPP). This split has turned ethnic identity into a proxy for partisan competition, especially after the 2017 assembly elections that saw the BJP form a coalition government with the NPP and the People's Democratic Front (PDF).

The 2020‑2021 Manipur ethnic clashes—triggered by a controversial land‑ownership bill—resulted in over 150 deaths and the displacement of more than 30 000 people. The violence highlighted the inadequacy of the state’s police force, which at the time numbered just 12,000 officers for a territory of 22,000 sq km, far below the national average of 1.5 officers per 1,000 residents. The legacy of that conflict continues to shape the security calculus of both the Kuki‑Zo and Tangkhul communities.

Recent Violence: A Pattern of Targeted Attacks

The killing of Haogin Lhouvum on June 9, 2024, was not an isolated incident. According to a joint statement released by Kuki civil‑society organisations (CSOs) on June 10, at least 13 Kuki‑Zo civilians—including three pastors—had been murdered in separate attacks over the preceding three months. The perpetrators were alleged to be members of Tangkhul‑affiliated militant outfits, though no formal charge sheets have been filed.

• June 9 – Lasan Village (Tamenglong): Lhouvum was shot while returning from a market. The assailants fled on two motorcycles, leaving behind a trail of bullet‑worn shells.
• May 28 – Khangkhui Village (Ukhrul): Two Kuki‑Zo youths were ambushed during a night patrol; both succumbed to gunshot wounds.
• April 15 – Khangcham Village (Churachandpur): A fire‑bomb attack destroyed three homes, killing a 12‑year‑old girl.

In parallel, eleven Kuki‑Zo villages have been set ablaze since March 2024, with Kultuh village in Kamjong district suffering a particularly brutal attack on June 5 that claimed two lives. Satellite imagery from the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) confirms that at least 4.2 sq km of forest cover in the western districts has been cleared by arson, a tactic that not only displaces civilians but also disrupts the region’s fragile ecosystem.

The cumulative death toll—estimated at 27 civilians (including 5 women) and 4 security personnel—represents a 38 % increase in homicide rates compared with the same period in 2023, according to the Manipur Police Crime Statistics Bureau. The rise in targeted killings has prompted the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to issue a warning about “escalating communal violence in the Northeast” and to recommend a rapid‑response task force.

Security Gap: Institutional Failures and the Rise of Vigilantism

The protest on National Highway‑2 was organised by the Committee on Tribal Unity (CoTU) and a coalition of Kuki‑Zo CSOs, who accused the state government of “strategic paralysis.” Their grievances centre on three core failures:

1. Insufficient Police Presence: The Manipur Police force has been reduced by 15 % since 2022, leaving many remote villages without a permanent outpost. In Kangpokpi district, the police‑to‑population ratio is now 1:2,500, well above the national benchmark of 1:1,200.
2. Lack of Intelligence Sharing: The Intelligence Bureau’s regional hub in Imphal has reportedly been understaffed, resulting in delayed alerts about militant movements. A Freedom of Information request filed by the Kuki‑Zo Forum revealed that only 27 % of the 1,200 actionable tips received in the last six months were forwarded to field units.
3. Political Interference: Several elected representatives from the ruling BJP‑NPP coalition have been alleged to maintain informal links with Tangkhul militant factions, a claim that the state government has denied but which fuels community suspicion.

In response, some