The Unlikely Guardians of Manipur's Periphery

On a sweltering afternoon in June 2024, a delegation of 52 representatives from 28 Meitei villages in Imphal East's peripheral regions gathered outside the Chief Minister's office in Manipur's capital. Their demand was as unexpected as it was controversial: they wanted the government to allow a militant camp operated by the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) to remain in their area. This was not a plea for disarmament or peace talks—it was a direct appeal for the continuation of armed non-state actors as their primary security providers.

The scene encapsulates a profound crisis of governance in Manipur, where the state's inability to protect its citizens has led to a dangerous inversion of traditional security paradigms. In a region where ethnic violence has claimed over 200 lives and displaced more than 60,000 people since May 2023, the villagers' stance reveals a disturbing truth: for many in Northeast India, militant groups are no longer seen as threats to security, but as its last line of defense.

This phenomenon is not unique to Manipur. Across conflict-ridden regions of the world—from Colombia's rural areas to Afghanistan's tribal belts—communities have historically turned to armed groups when state protection fails. However, Manipur presents a particularly complex case study. Here, the lines between protector and perpetrator have blurred to the point where a militant group that once waged war against the Indian state is now being actively courted by civilians as their shield against other armed factions.

The Roots of Distrust: A Century of Broken Promises

To understand why Meitei villagers would prefer the presence of a militant camp over state security forces, one must examine Manipur's turbulent history—a narrative marked by colonial exploitation, post-independence neglect, and repeated failures of governance.

The Colonial Legacy and Post-Independence Marginalization

Manipur's integration into the Indian Union in 1949 was a contentious process that sowed the seeds of future conflicts. The former princely state, which had enjoyed relative autonomy under British indirect rule, was merged with India through what many historians describe as coercive means. The merger agreement, signed by Manipur's Maharaja Bodhchandra Singh under duress while in Shillong, was never ratified by the state's elected assembly—a fact that continues to fuel separatist sentiments to this day.

Following integration, Manipur was initially granted the status of a Part C state, placing it under direct central administration. This period saw the erosion of local institutions and the imposition of external governance structures that failed to account for Manipur's unique ethnic composition. The state's subsequent downgrade to a union territory in 1956, and its eventual elevation to full statehood in 1972, did little to address the growing sense of alienation among its people.

The Rise of Insurgency and State Response

The first major militant group, the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), was formed in 1964 with the stated goal of achieving Manipur's independence from India. Over the decades, the insurgency landscape evolved into a complex web of ethnic-based armed groups, including Meitei, Naga, and Kuki factions, each with their own political agendas and territorial ambitions.

The Indian state's response to these movements has been characterized by a mix of military operations, political negotiations, and economic packages. However, these efforts have often been undermined by heavy-handed tactics that alienated local populations. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), imposed in Manipur in 1980, became a symbol of state oppression, with numerous reports of human rights violations by security forces further eroding public trust.

According to data from the South Asia Terrorism Portal, between 1992 and 2023, Manipur witnessed 5,378 insurgency-related deaths, including 2,345 civilians, 1,212 security personnel, and 1,821 militants. These figures underscore the chronic nature of the conflict and the state's inability to establish lasting peace.

The Security Vacuum: Why Villagers Prefer Militants Over the State

The recent demand by Meitei villagers to retain the UNLF camp in their area is not an isolated incident but rather a symptom of a broader systemic failure. This section examines the key factors that have led to this paradoxical situation, where armed groups are perceived as more reliable protectors than the state itself.

The Failure of Formal Security Structures

Manipur's security architecture has been stretched thin by the dual challenges of ethnic conflict and insurgency. The state's police force, with a sanctioned strength of 23,000 personnel, has been overwhelmed by the scale of violence. As of 2023, the actual strength stood at approximately 18,000, with many posts remaining vacant due to recruitment freezes and attrition.

The central government has deployed significant military and paramilitary forces to the state, including units from the Indian Army, Assam Rifles, and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). However, these forces have often been accused of operating in a reactive rather than proactive manner. A 2022 report by the Manipur Human Rights Commission noted that security forces frequently arrived at conflict sites only after violence had already erupted, limiting their ability to prevent attacks.

The Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement, signed with Kuki militant groups in 2008, was intended to create a framework for peace talks. However, critics argue that the agreement has effectively legitimized armed groups without addressing the root causes of conflict. Many Kuki factions operating under the SoO have been accused of continuing extortion, drug trafficking, and territorial expansion, further destabilizing the region.

The Ethnic Dimension: When Protection Becomes a Zero-Sum Game

The ethnic violence that erupted in Manipur in May 2023 has fundamentally altered the security calculus for many communities. The conflict, which pitted Meitei groups against Kuki-Zomi tribes, has created a climate of fear where communities no longer trust the state to protect them from ethnic rivals.

In this context, militant groups have stepped in to fill the security vacuum, often along ethnic lines. The UNLF, as a Meitei-dominated group, has positioned itself as a defender of Meitei interests in the face of perceived Kuki aggression. This ethnic alignment has made the group a natural ally for Meitei villagers who feel abandoned by the state.

A survey conducted by the Centre for Development and Peace Studies in 2023 found that 62% of Meitei respondents in conflict-affected areas expressed greater trust in ethnic-based militant groups than in state security forces. This statistic underscores the depth of the trust deficit and the challenges facing any reconciliation effort.

The Economics of Protection: Extortion as a Security Tax

The relationship between villagers and militant groups is not purely ideological—it is also transactional. In many parts of Manipur, armed groups have established parallel governance structures that provide security in exchange for financial support. This system, often euphemistically referred to as "taxation," has become an accepted part of life in the state's peripheral regions.

According to a 2021 report by the National Investigation Agency (NIA), militant groups in Manipur collect an estimated ₹500 crore (approximately $60 million) annually through extortion. While this figure is staggering, it also reveals the extent to which these groups have embedded themselves in the local economy. For many villagers, paying "taxes" to militant groups is seen as a necessary cost of doing business—a form of insurance against violence and instability.

The Nungshum village case is illustrative. Local business owners report that since the UNLF camp was established in the area, incidents of extortion and violence by rival Kuki groups have decreased significantly. While the UNLF itself collects "donations" from villagers, these payments are seen as more predictable and less onerous than the demands made by multiple competing factions.

The Psychology of Fear: When the State Becomes the Threat

The most disturbing aspect of Manipur's security paradox is the way in which state security forces have come to be perceived as a source of threat rather than protection. This perception is rooted in decades of alleged human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and sexual violence.

The infamous case of Thangjam Manorama, a 32-year-old woman who was allegedly raped and murdered by Assam Rifles personnel in 2004, became a symbol of state impunity. Despite widespread protests and a judicial inquiry, no security personnel were convicted in the case. Such incidents have left deep scars on the collective psyche of Manipur's population.

A 2020 study by the Human Rights Alert, a Manipur-based NGO, documented 1,528 cases of alleged extrajudicial killings by security forces in the state between 1979 and 2012. While the Indian government has disputed these figures, the sheer volume of complaints underscores the scale of the problem.

In this context, the presence of a militant group like the UNLF, which is at least theoretically accountable to the local population, can seem preferable to the arbitrary power of state security forces. The villagers' demand to retain the UNLF camp reflects a grim calculation: in a choice between two armed actors, they have opted for the one they believe they can negotiate with.

Case Studies: When Militants Become the Lesser Evil

The phenomenon of communities embracing militant groups for protection is not new in conflict zones. However, Manipur presents several unique case studies that illustrate the complex dynamics at play. This section examines three specific examples that shed light on the broader trends shaping the state's security landscape.

The Nungshum Village Model: A Template for Militant-Led Security

Nungshum village, located in the Khamenlok Hill Range of Imphal East district, has become a focal point in the debate over militant-led security. The UNLF camp in the village, operated by the Pambei faction, has been in place for over a decade, evolving from a clandestine militant outpost to a de facto security provider for the surrounding 28 villages.

The transformation of the Nungshum camp offers insights into how militant groups can transition from insurgent organizations to community protectors. According to village elders, the UNLF's role in the area has evolved through several distinct phases:

1. Phase 1: Establishment (2010-2014) - The camp was initially set up as a training and recruitment base for the UNLF. During this period, the group's presence was largely clandestine, with minimal interaction with local villagers.
2. Phase 2: Conflict Escalation (2015-2018) - As tensions between Meitei and Kuki communities increased, the UNLF began positioning itself as a defender of Meitei interests. The group's activities expanded to include patrolling the surrounding areas and confronting Kuki militants.
3. Phase 3: Community Integration (2019-2023) - Following a series of attacks by Kuki groups on Meitei villages, the UNLF camp became a hub for community protection. The group established a system of "neighborhood watches" and began coordinating with village councils on security matters.
4. Phase 4: Formalization (2023-Present) - After the UNLF signed a peace agreement with the Indian government in November 2023, the group's status in Nungshum became semi-legitimate. The villagers' recent demand to retain the camp reflects their desire to formalize this arrangement.

Interviews with Nungshum residents reveal a complex relationship with the UNLF. While acknowledging the group's militant past, many villagers express a pragmatic acceptance of their current role. "We know they are not saints," said one local farmer who requested anonymity. "But when the Kuki militants come to burn our houses or demand money, it is the UNLF boys who stand between us and them. Where are the police? Where is the army?"

The Nungshum model has become a template that other Meitei villages are seeking to replicate. In nearby areas of Imphal East and West districts, village councils have reportedly approached other Meitei militant groups, such as the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), to establish similar protective arrangements.

The Churachandpur Experiment: When State and Militants Collaborate

While Meitei villages are turning to militant groups for protection, some Kuki-dominated areas have adopted a different approach: collaborating with state security forces to counter Meitei militant activity. The district of Churachandpur, a Kuki-Zomi stronghold, offers a contrasting case study that highlights the ethnic dimensions of Manipur's security paradox.

In Churachandpur, Kuki militant groups operating under the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement have worked alongside Assam Rifles and state police to establish a network of checkpoints and patrol routes. This collaboration has created a de facto security zone that has largely insulated the district from the ethnic violence affecting other parts of Manipur.

The success of this model can be seen in the relative stability of Churachandpur compared to other districts. According to data from the Manipur Police, Churachandpur accounted for only 8% of violent incidents in the state between May 2023 and June 2024, despite being home to a significant portion of Manipur's Kuki population. In contrast, districts like Imphal East and West, where Meitei villages are located, accounted for 42% of violent incidents during the same period.

However, the Churachandpur model is not without its critics. Meitei groups allege that the security arrangements in the district are one-sided, allowing Kuki militants to operate with impunity while targeting Meitei communities. "The SoO groups are using the agreement as a shield," said a representative of the Meitei Leepun, a civil society organization. "They attack our villages, then retreat to their designated camps where the security forces protect them."

The contrasting approaches in Nungshum and Churachandpur illustrate the ethnic polarization that has come to define Manipur's security landscape. In the absence of a neutral state security apparatus, communities are forced to choose between aligning with militant groups or risking exposure to violence from rival factions.

The Moreh Border Town: When Militants Become Economic Gatekeepers

The border town of Moreh, located on the India-Myanmar frontier, offers a unique case study in how militant groups can evolve into economic gatekeepers. The town, which serves as a major trading hub between India and Southeast Asia, has long been a contested space where armed groups vie for control of lucrative cross-border trade routes.

In Moreh, the security dynamic is shaped by the town's economic importance. The annual trade volume through Moreh exceeds ₹3,000 crore (approximately $360 million), making it a prime target for extortion by militant groups. However, the presence of these groups has also created a perverse form of stability, where their control over trade routes has reduced the incidence of violent crime.

According to a 2022 study by the Institute for Conflict Management, Moreh has one of the lowest rates of violent crime among Manipur's major towns, despite its strategic importance. The study attributes this to the "order" imposed by militant groups, which have established clear rules for trade and extortion. "In Moreh, the militants act as a parallel government," said a local trader who requested anonymity. "They set the taxes, they resolve disputes, and they punish those who break the rules. It may not be legal, but it is predictable."

The Moreh case highlights the complex relationship between security and economics in conflict zones. For many traders, the presence of militant groups is a necessary evil—a cost of doing business in a region where the state has failed to provide basic security. However, this arrangement also perpetuates a cycle of dependency, where communities become beholden to armed groups for their economic survival.

The Indian government's recent efforts to fence the India-Myanmar border and end the Free Movement Regime (FMR) have added a new dimension to Moreh's security dynamics.